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W E have traced in the foregoing part the prindpal cases bear-ing directly upon the federal power of incorporation. To 
gain a just perspective of the attitude the court may take 
upon the constitutionality of an act requiring uniform federal in-
corporation of all businesses engaged in interstate commerce it is 
necessary to complete our review by an examination of the tren~ 
of the court's decisions involving other portions of the field of com-
merce regulation. The construction placed upon acts exerting other 
forms of regulation will not be so conclusive to our inquiry as the 
adjudication of the cases reviewed in the foregoing section, but by 
exhibiting the general trend of the judicial reasoning upon the 
subject of the commercial power it will provide us with a wider 
basis of judgment. We shall first ex~ine the development of the 
Congressional control over foreign commerce, and following, its reg-
ulation of the various instrumentalities and objects of interstate 
commerce. 
From the earliest period of our constitutional development the 
power of Congress over foreign commerce has been held complete 
and unlimited within the field upon which it operates. The full ex-
tent of the power was relied upon by the act of Congress of Decem-
ber 22, 18o7, whereby an embargo was laid upon all sea-going ves-
sels then in ports or harbors of the United States. No act of regu-
lation of commerce could be more drastic. Its practical effect was a 
prohibition of all foreign commerce and that was the effect contem-
plated by the Congress which enacted it. Yet its constitutionality 
was never questioned before the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The only adjudication upon the constitutional validity of 
the law came from the United States District Court of Massachu-
setts in the case of the United States v. The William.1 In a long and 
able opinion in that case Judge Davis set forth very clearly the na-
ture and scope of the regulatory power in Congress over foreign 
commerce. He regarded it from the lofty view point of national 
interests. The argument had been advanced, he said, that the "Pow-
er to regulate * * * cannot be understood to give a power to 
annihilate."*** "Let this be admitted," he answered, "and are they 
(Congress) not at liberty to consider the present prohibitory sys-
tem as necessary and proper to an eventual beneficial regulation? 
128 Fed. Cases 614. 
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On the abstract question of constitutional power I see nothing to 
prohibit or restrain the measure." . 
"Further,'' the learned. judge continues, "the power to regulate 
commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures exclu-
sively ·beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advancement; 
but, in our national system * * * it is also to be considered as an in-
strument for other purposes of general policy and interest." "The 
situation of the United States, in ordinary times, might render leg-
islative interferences, relative to commerce, less necessary; but the 
capacity and power of managing and directing it, for the advance-
ment of great national purposes seems an important ingredient of 
sovereignty."2 Words such as these;: must give heart to those who 
see in the Constitution not a rigid code of law but a declaration of 
guiding principles and a provision of forms and means of -organized 
authority which· are intended to serve rather than to shackle the 
growth of a great nation. It is true this opinion did not emanate 
from the highest tribunal to which is entrusted the interpretation of 
the Constitution. But it was never overthrown by that court; and 
that it should have been acquiesced in immediately is some evidence 
that it was prevalently i:egarded as sound. 
This broad construction was placed upon the Constitutional con-
trol over foreign commerce in 18o8. Not until 1903 by a case in-
volving tariff legislation was the extent of that power again called 
in question. An Act of Congress of March 2, 1897, provided for 
standardizing, by administrative determination, the quality of teas 
imported. In the case of Buttfield v. Stranahau3 the plaintiff had at-
tempted to introduce a grade in-ferior to that permitted by the offic-
ial regulations. It was seized and destroyed. The court in deciding 
against the plaintiff declared: ''As a result of the complete power of 
Congress over foreign commerce, it necessarily follows that no in- · 
dividual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations which is so 
broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to 
determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this 
country arid the terms upon which a right to import may be exer-
cised." The court concluded:- "It results that a statute which re-
strains -the introduction of particular goods info the-United States 
from considerations of public policy does not violate the "due pro-
cess" clause of the Constitution." It is clear from this decision that 
the court has not renounced the broad construction put upon the 
= It must be kept in mind that these words were used respecting authority ewer 
extraterritorial and not inte~ trade. Comment upon this impoitmt disUndion -.ill 
be found, infra, p. 150. et seq. 
3 192 u. s. 470. 
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commerce power in the early case of the United States v. The Wil-
liam and since theu generally accepted:' It affirms and gives the 
highest sanction to that view of the commerce power which hence-
forth may be taken as incontestable with regard to foreign inter-
course. 
Congress exercised its authority in a more restricted field by for-
bidding the importation of opium in an Act of February 9, 1909. 
In conformity with the trend of the decisions already mentioned it 
was held in Brolan v. U11itcd .'>'tales that it was "frivolous to ques-
tion the power of Congress to prohibit importations." 
It appears then that Congr<.>ss may exercise this power not only 
for the purpose of conserving the health, comfort, safety, and morals 
of the people, but for the purpose of public policy, to promote trade 
in certain quarters, to favor certain lines of industry to the detri-
ment of others. And further it appears that for those purposes it 
may use what means it deems best fitted for their attainment even 
to absolute prohibition, providing only0 that the restriction operates 
equally upon all who are engaged, or who attempt to engage, in the 
business so regulated. This is the ground upon which all tariff acts 
from the first slightly protective measures of 17897 to the present 
day have been tacitly supported by the adjudication of cases involv-
ing their specific provisions,8 since the power to levy duties and tolls 
as such presumably does not extend beyond what is necessary for 
revenue purposes. 0 
The control exercised by Congress over immigration tho resting 
at least in part upon its power to regulate foreign commerce need 
hardly attract our detailed attention, since it has generally been held 
· by the court to be "an incident of sovereignty" springing from the 
•An interesting case involving the authority of Congress over foreign commerce was 
presented in The Abbey Dodge (223 U. S. 166). The vessel had been employed in 
gathering sponges during a certain period within a prescribed area in the Gulf of Mex· 
ico in violation of an act of Congress. The court said: "the vessel was engaged in .for-
eign commerce and was therefore amenable to the regulating power of . Congress over 
that subject.*** The practices from the beginning, sanctioned by the decisions of · 
this court establish that Congress by an exertion of its power to regulate foreign com· 
merce has the authority to forbid merchandise carried in such commerce from entering 
the United States". The parallelism between the manner of e.xercising control over this 
extra-territorial industry and that attempted by the federal child-labor law over mining 
and manufacturing industries is striking. 
•Calvert: "The Regulation of Commerce". pp. 44, 52. 
~Bogart: "Economic History of the United States", pp. II7·II8. 
Taussig: "Tariff History of the United States", pp. r4-r5. 
•Soloman v. Artliur, 102 U. S. 208; American Net & Twine Co. v. U'ortlti11glo11, 
141 U. S. 468; Ben..--inger v. U. S., 192 U. S. 38. 
9 That tariff legislation combines power to regulate commerce and taxing power, see 
Freund: "Police Power", p. 63. 
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very fact of the unity of the United States in the face of any fo~­
eign state or power. Such is the doctrine expressed by ·Justice 
Gray in the authoritative case of' Fong Ytt Ting v. The United 
States.10 In that opinion all the cases upon right of entrance «?f 
_ aliens are collated, together with an elaborate review of the commen-
taries and authorities. The court declared that: "The right to ex-
clude or expel all alien~, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon 
certain conditions, in war or in peace" is "an inherent and inalien-
able right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to 
its safety, its independence and its welfare.» That it is in principle 
distinct from and independent of the right to regulate foreign com-
merce would seem to flow directly from "the course of adjudication 
of all the oriental immigration cases.11 
It must be concluded that while the course of adjudication of 
cases involving the Congressional power over foreign commerce cer-
tainly recognizes a "full and complete" power in Congress extend-
ing even to absolute and universal prohibition on grounds solely of 
public policy, it furnishes no secure foundation for the same con-
struction of the power to regulate interstate commerce. In the for-
. mer sphere Congress is exercising a power which is affected with, 
when it is not integrally combined with, its sovereign power of gov-
erning our political relations with foreign nations~ In the latter 
sphere the exercise of its power of regulation touches the powers and 
rights of the constituent states to which it bears a strict constitution-
al relationship and which have a residual if not a reciprocal control in 
our constitutional system. 12 The limitation that this latter fact in-
volves cannot be too strenuously insisted upon, for the Supreme 
Court "itself has upon more than one occa.Sion13 let slip remarks in 
obiter dicta identifying the extent and character of the two powers. 
10 149 u. s. ~8. 
11 The line of cleavage had also been previously intimated in PeGple v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique (107 U. S. 59) if. indeed, the decision of thaf case did not 
im-olve this distinction. And in the more recent decision of Oce1111ic Narigation Com· 
pan;s v. Stranahan (214 U. S.- 342) the court in sustaining the Act of Congress of March 
3, 1903, establishing rigorous health standards for :ill= immigrants and imposllig some 
really burdensome duties and liabilities upon steamshlp companies in order to proride 
a thorough enforcement of the law fully accepts ariii rcaflinns the above principle. It 
declared: "Iu effect, all the contentions p(CSSCd in argument concerning tbe r<:pll8tJ3Dcy 
, of the statute to the due -process clause really disregard the complete and absolute power 
of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals. .. 
""This view is expressed hy C. J. Fuller in the diss=ting opinion in the LD'lfcry 
case, 188 U. S. 373-374. It ~ of course. upon the toth Amendment. 
:u Gibbons v. Ogdrn, 9 \Vb.eat. 187; Tlie Lottery Case. 288 U. S. 321: Cnzfdizr ,, •• 
Ke11t11cky, 241 lJ. S. 471. In tbese opinions the control m-cr intcrst:ite comm= is 
declared to be upon the same plane as that over foreign commerce. though in neither 
case was the latter power in question. 
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The opinions in Buttfirld v. Stranahan14 and Brolan v. The United 
States~ however negative that assumption. 
But although the two powers are theoretically and logically sep-
arable, on account of the difference in the respective spheres in 
which they operate,1° so that the power to regulate interstate com-
merce cannot be construed in reason and has not been interpreted 
in law to extend to an absolute and universal prohibition, there are 
none the less very good and sound reasons why it may be construed 
to extend to such regulation as is based not strictly upon the police 
power in the sense of health, morals, safety, sanitation measures17 
but upon grounds of public policy. This view has already been stat-
ed most succinctly in an opinion by· Judge ROGERS in the United 
States Circuit Court.18 He says, speaking of the power of Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce: "the commerce power is plenary, 
is not confined or limited by the scope of the ordinary police powers 
as they are exercised by the state, but is restrained and limited only 
by the Constitution itself." There would seem to be no basis in 
reason or in the accepted tenets of constitutional construction why 
the regulatory power over interstate commerce which is granted in 
the same clause of the Constitution and in the same terms as the 
regulatory power over foreign commerce should not be interpreted 
to extend thus far, even though the peculiar relation of the latter to 
the sovereign power to govern foreign relations may make it effec-
tive still further. It is, on the other hand, a powerful argument in 
favor of such a construction upon the the power to regulate inter-
state commerce. If one of two powers, each of which is granted in 
the same terms, is absolute, it furnishes an excellent presumption that 
the other is not narrowly relative, but relative only to the most fun-
damental principles of polity and of justice. 
Of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce the first to receive 
the attention of Congress was the famous Cumberland Road ;10 but 
.. 19" u. s. 492. 
"236 U. S. 216; where it is laid down that: "The very postulate upon which the 
antltority of Congress to absolutely prohibit foreign importations as expounded by the 
decisions of this court rests is the broad distinction between the two powers." 
1• See Prentice: ''The Federal Power over Carriers and Corporations", p. 147; and 
Judson: "The Law of Interstate Commerce", pp. 5-6. 
u Cakert: "Regulation of Commerce", pp. 52-53 is skeptical about this. But Heisler 
"Federal Incorporation" argues in favor of such a construction of the power, at least 
by necessary implication (pp. 62-69). 
18 The citation has been lost; but see for statements similar though not quite so spe· 
cific: Slicrfock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103 (by Justice Field); Emploscrs' Lial•ility Cases, 
207 U. S. 526 (dissenting opinion by Justice Moody); Seco11d Emplo;,ocrs' Lial•. Cases, 
223 U. S. 47, (in opinion by Justice VanDevanter, points "3" and "4". 
"'Provided for by Act of March 29, 1806; U. S. Stat. at Large JI, 357. The road 
was constructed and kept in repair by federal agents and from frderal appropriations. 
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the nrst adjudication of the extent of federal control came in a con-
troversy over the respective powers of the state and national Govern· 
ments concerning the navigation of waters within the territorial 
limits of a state. In Gibbons v. Ogden20 the right of a state to grant 
an exclusive privilege to operate steamboats in the navigable waters 
lying within its boundaries was denied by the Supreme Court. In 
the course of a painstaking analysis of the extent and character of 
the commerce power the court said: "It has, we believe, been univers-
ally admitted that these words comprehend every species of com-
mercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. 
No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any 
foreign nation to which this power does not extend. It has been 
truly said that 'commerce' as this word is used in the Constitution 
is a unit every part of which is indicated by the term. If this be 
the admitted meaning of the word in its application to foreign na-
tions it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence and 
remain a unit, unless there be some plain, intelligible cause which 
alters it." 
The court found no such "plain, intelligible cause" and so held 
that the states had no power to grant exclusive franchises in this 
field reserved to the control of Congress.. -But if the states can 
grant no exclusive franchises to engage in foreign or interstate 
commerce then on what ground are special franchises from states 
to engage in that trade upheld? The difference is that exclusive 
franchises are a hindrance and burden while special or corporate 
franchises have tended, during a certain period, to promote the 
growth and prosperity of that commerce. In the former case it 
could not in reason be held that such a franchise might be operative 
until Congress took direct adverse action; in the latter case the.view 
might be taken that the-silence of Congress is a permission that fran'.:" 
chises and corporate liabilities acquired under state action may be 
operative until Congress takes some positive action to exercise in 
a similar manner its paramount authority. This is because in the -
former case the state action is quite inconsistent with any construc-
tion that might be put upon the inaction of Congress, whereas in 
the latter case state action operating up to a point to facilitate rather 
than to obstruct the course of commerce iS interpreted as concurrent 
w the "negative action" of Congress and conformable to its will. 
The incapacity of the states_ to grant e..xclusive franchises, then, rel-
:nive to the participation in interstate and foreign commerce, is 
The consent of the states through which the road passed was expressly required by the 
'"rms of the Act. 
"'9 Wheat. I. 
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strong evidence of the contingency of their right to grant any fran-
chises exercisable in interstate commerce. 
The principle of Gibbons v. Ogden was somewhat modified by 
subsequent cases21 so that the net development before the Civil War 
of the law concerning interstate ferriage may be stated as follows: 
the entire subject of rules and regulations for its conduct was con-
sidered of a local nature and under the concurrent, perhaps exclu-
sive, control of the states so long as no obstructions were placed up-
on interstate communication. The second stage in the growth of 
the federal power over the subject is illustrated by the case of the 
Gloucester Ferry Compawy v. Pcmisylvania.22 In this case a state 
attempted to tax a foreign ferriage corporation whose boats in the 
regular course of business touched at wharves within its jurisdic-
tion. The state was denied the power so to tax these instruments 
of interstate commerce upon the ground that it might operate to 
impose discriminatory burdens upon that commerce. But it was 
still maintained that the states under their police powers might make 
all needful regulations for navigation, even requiring licenses where 
no tax was connected with the same. 
A third stage in the development of the law governing the opera-
tion of interstate ferries was foreshadowed by the decision in St. 
Clair v. Interstate Transfer Compawy.23 It was there held that a 
state could not require a license for railroad transports, which were 
distinguished from ferries,24 notwithstanding the fact that no pe-
cuniary burden was placed upon a licensee, since these boats were 
in effect parts of an interstate transportation system in a general 
rather than a merely local sense. In New York Central Railroad 
Compa11y v. Hudson Coimty25 the problem was definitively settled by 
·an e.xtension of the federal power over the whole subject. In sub-
stance, the court has come in these cases to reinterpret the silence 
of Congress in the matter of licenses or its indirect action26 in the 
matter of tolls as evidence of its will to have complete and exclusive 
control. 
It will be recognized from this line of cases that there has been 
a steady e>.."Pansion of the federal power over ferries plying across 
state boundaries which has been in harmony with the change in the 
%1.Fanr.ing v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Conway v. Taylor, l Black. 603. 
""u4 U. S. 196. This case follows St. Louis v. Tlie Ferry Company, 1 t \Vall. 423, 
and lViggins Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365 
""192 u. s. 454-
=•As a lower court had ruled in New York v. New England Transfer Co., Fed. 
Cases No. 10, 197. 
::?$ =7 u. s. 248. 
""The court refers to the provisions of the Interst. Com. Act of 1SE'7. 
actual objective conditions. In the early days, or the period preced-
ing the immense development of production- for interstate markets 
and a vast network of steam transportation systems, state control 
of ferries operating across rivers bounding states was not only justi-
fiable but positively more propitious for the extension of such com-
munication than federal regulation on account of the local charac-
ter and limited scope of the business. But when presently the di-
versity in regulation and the want of uniformity in service touched 
the movement of a greatly augmented interstate commerce so closely 
as to threaten an appreciable obstruction to that commerce, it be-
came necessary to hold that the interference of Congress in a por-
tion of the field displaced by so much the effective range of state 
regulation. Finally when the interstate commerce had assumed eveti 
larger proportions and ferries had become parts of more intricate 
lines of communication the power of control ~ver interstate ferriage 
was adjudged complete and exclusive in Congress. 
Bridges connecting points in the different states were in the early 
decades of our history constructed and operated under the super-
vision of the states, sometimes acting severally, sometimes jointly. 
As early as the '40s _and '50s however, Congress began to take ac-
count of its authority over these structures. Its initial step was per-
haps a somewhat impolitic one, but it served nevertheless to con-
firm the power. The Supreme Court in 1851 had held27 that the 
Wheeling Bridge across the Ohio River erected under authority of 
the state of Virginia was a public iiuisance28 in that it .constituted a 
material obstruction to the navigation of the river. Congress-was 
prevailed upon the ·following year to recognize the bridge as a law-
ful structure. The court in declaring-29 this act constitutional, there-
fore, was compelled to hold in effect that the power of Congress 
was so exhaustive in this field that it might declare that not to be a 
nuisance which the highest judicial tribunal in the country had de-
clared was such. Relative to the consequences· of the act of Con-
gress the court by Mr. Justice N:itr.soN said: "It will not do to say 
that the exercise of an admitted power of Congres5 conferred by 
the Constitution is to be withheld if it appears or can be shown that 
"' 13 Howard 519. 
""There were several 1>ackets ·regularly plying past Wheeling which could not pass 
under the span without undergoing expensive alterations and being subject to a contin-
uing burden as long as they operated. It seems pretty clear, moreover, that one of the 
principal motives for the construction of the bridge was to make Wheeling the liead of 
na,igation on the Ohio, and thus cut off the trade of 'rations Pennsylvania cities. par-
ticularly Pittsburgh. 
"" 18 Howard 421. 
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the effect and operation of the law may incidentally extend beyond 
the limitation of the power." 
In the case of the Newport B1·idge Compan'j' v. The United 
States3° it is affirmed that the control of Congress over bridges be-
tween two states is paramount, and that state charters for the con-
struction of such bridges operate by suffrance to this extent: that 
Congress may regulate, prescribe new requirements, or entirely an-
nul the exercise of franchise rights, whenever such measures are 
deemed "essential to secure the due protection to the navigation of 
the river''. The bridge company had been incorporated by special 
legislative enactments of Ohio and Kentucky which empowered it 
to build the- bridge across the Ohio according to certain specifica-
tions, but subjected it to such additional requirements as Congress 
might make. By special acts of 1869 and 1871 Congress twice 
changed the requirements in respect to span and headway as it had 
reserved the right to do, but in the latter act it was provided that 
the United States might be sued in equity for damages caused by the 
alterations. After the erection of the bridge according to the ap-
proved plans the company brought its action for indemnification, 
which was denied. The court said, "The paramount power of reg-
u1ating bridges that affect the navigation of navigable rivers of the 
United States is in Congress. * * * But when power ~vas given to 
build this bridge it was deemed expedient in the interest of com-
merce to be more specific, and by reserving the power to withdraw 
the assent of Congress to what might prove to be an obstruction to 
navigation, to imply· at least a reservation of power to make that 
unlawfu1 which, while the assent continued, would be lawful." "* * * 
the (Congressional) resolution of 1869 became*** the paramount 
license for the construction and maintenance of the bridge, and the 
Company by accepting its provisions became subject to all the limi-
tations and reservations of power which Congress saw fit to im-
pose". "The action of Congress is supreme and overrides all the 
states may do". Herein is -contained the essential guarantee that the 
power of Congress is not merely negative. It is a full, complete, 
positive power,31-power to direct that commerce by the enactment 
of laws tending to effectuate ends which are deemed desirable for 
the general well-being. It is not only the power to determine what 
is injurious and obstructive to the movement of interstate com-
merce and to remove or counteract such hindrances. It is the power 
to determine the manner in which the instruments of interstate traf-
"" 105 u. s. 470. 
• 1 See also S. Carolina v. Georgia decided shortly previous, 93 U. S. + 
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fie shall be constructed and operated according as expediency ~d 
public policy seem to point the way. .. 
The full significance of this doctrine can only be understood in 
conjunction with the view expressed in the dissenting opinion by 
Justice Field. He said : "I ts regulation (that pf foreign and inter-
state commerce) therefore required such control over our harbors, 
bays and navigable streams * * * as might be necessary to keep navi--
gation free from mmecessary obstructions,..::i2 and might legitimately 
extend to making such improvements as would facilitate the passage 
of vessels, render their anchorage safe, etc. * * * to this extent its 
power over navigable waters goes under the commerce clause; no 
further. Unless therefore the free navigation of the public waters 
is impeded by what a state may do or permit, Congress cannot in-
terfere with its action***." 
It was this view-this very limited and restricted view-which the 
majority of the court flatly repudiated. The vigor of statement and 
cogency of reasoning of the decisions in which the earlier tradition 
of the commerce power had been set forth were apparently too 
great to admit of departure from their unmistakable spirit. The 
clear distinction between the majority and minority views makes 
this case a singularly important landmark in the development of con-
stitutional interpretation, coming as it did at a critical juncture. 
After the Civil War had worked out such a radical disturbance in 
the relative positions of the states and the federal authority in our 
scheme Qf government there opened up a new field for constitutional 
construction. The three new amendments offered great possibilities 
for constructive statesmanship, through the medium of juristic in-
terpretation. But there was none to take the place of Hamilton, or 
of Marshall, or of Webster. The trend of constitutfonal interpre-
tation viewed in its larger aspects was for some time directly away 
from the earlier tradition. The persistent course was toward pre-
serving the rights and powers of the states so far as might be reas-
onably compatible with constitutional provisions. 
In view of this recognized fact the importance of the decision in 
the Newport Bridge case becomes cleare.r. In a period when a large 
part of the field of organic law was being sensibly modified and shad-
ed by the obscure influence of judicial preconceptions and sympathies 
of a slightly different blend, the original traditions of the scope and 
nature of the power over interstate and foreign commerce were pre-
served. At least this constitutional provision escaped a construc-
tion which would have emasculated it so far as positive, construc-
tive direction and control by Congress is concerned. -
., Italics those of the present writer. 
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The effect of the decisions in Gibson v. United States33 and in 
Scranton v. Whceler,2• which involved the question of interference 
with riparian rights by the constructio~ of dikes and piers for the 
improvement of navigation, was to continue and to re-enforce the 
view of the regulatory power of Congress adopted in the Newport 
Bridge case. The positive and comprehensive character of the pow-
er is reaffirmed, at least insofar as the power relates to the control 
over navigation. It is not confined to a merely supervisory function 
to provide against actual obstructions and the removal of nuisances, 
in short, to keep the navigable streams.which are the paths of inter-
state commerce unclogged. It extends to whatever action Congress 
may judge-to -be 1nthe public interest and tending to facilitate the-
movement of interstate commerce upon navigable streams. 
The Union Bridge case35 called into question the validity of an· Act 
of Congress known as The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which 
declared that any bridge or structure causing an unreasonable ob-
struction to interstate commerce upon navigable streams should, up-
on determination of the £.act by the Secretary of War, be altered or 
remodelled in such a way as might be prescribed by the Secretary 
of War, or entirely removed so as to permit reasonably free, unob-
structed navigation. Under the authority of this act the Union 
Bridge spanning the Alleghany River at Pittsburgh was condemned. 
The court, holding the act to be within the power of Congress to 
regulate an integral part of interstate commerce declared: "Although 
the bridge, when erected under the authority of a Pennsylvania 
charter, may have been a lawful structure, and although it may not 
have been an unreasonable obstruction to commerce and navigation . 
as then carried on, it must be taken, under the cases cited and on 
principle,' not only that the. company when exerting the power con-
ferred upon it by the state, did so with knowledge of the paramount 
authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, but 
that it erected the bridge subject to the possibility that Congress at 
some future time, when the public demanded, exert its power by ap-
propriate legislation to protect navigation against unreasonable ob-
struction." To similar effect in Louisville Bridge Company v. Unit-
ed Statcs36 it was decided that even a bridge erected under Congres-
siOnal sanction without any reservation of power to require altera-
tions and designated as a "lawful bridge" might subsequently be con-
demned, and not upon the ground of being a dangerous structure, 
.. 166 u. s. 269. 
"' 179 u. s. 141. 
""204 u. s. 364. 
""242 u. s. 409. 
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but solely upon the ground of being a present obstruction to naviga-
tion. It was stated that: "the Acts of 1862 and 1865 (under which 
the bridge was constructed) conferred upon appellant no irrepealable 
franchise to maintain its bridges precisely as it was orginally con-
structed." 
These cases then go no farther than the N cwport case, if indeed 
they go as far. For in these cases Congress made the operation of 
its enactment or the action of its executive agent contingent upon 
the actual existence of an unreasonable obstruction to commerce and · 
navigation. There was no evidence of such a fact nor any effort to 
ascertain whether such a fact existed in the Newport case, and the 
court held that an inquiry in regard to that fact was unnecessary. 
Nevertheless, in another light the Union case, at least, may be re-
garded as an even stronger case than the Newport case, since the 
Union Bridge Company was required to tear down its bridge alto-
gether, whereas the Newport Bridge Company was only required to 
make alterations. 
Gilman v. Philadelphw1 and Cardwell v. American Bridge Com-· 
pany38 involved the power of a state to authorize the construction 
of bridges over navigable streams which constituted effective blocks 
to steamboat transportatiori which was of a local nature, above the 
points where they were constructed. In both cases the court held 
that the state had the power mentioned. but only in the absence of 
legislation by Congress. It was pointed out that where the regula-
tion touched essentially local affairs, as in these cases, it would be 
presumed that Congress acquiesced therein and recognized the more 
favorable situation of the states for determining the best policy for 
such legislation. The state would, for instance, be in a ·better posi-
tion to know to what extent the community would be benefitted by 
unobstructed navigation and to what extent by a connecting bridge. 
This doctrine of the difference between that portion of the field 
which is local in its nature and that portion which is national was 
well set forth in the earlier case of Comity of Mobile v.- Kimball.38 
The plaintiffs contracted with a Board of Harbor Commissioners 
authorized by the Alabama legislature of 1867 to make improvements 
in Mobile Bay to do a certain job of dredging, and the work being 
inspected and approved but payment being refused they brought 
suit. The court, holding that the state or county could not withhold 
payment on the ground that the statute authori~ improvements 
to be made in navigable waters was unconstitutional. said: "That 
"'J 'Va!L 713. 
33 IIJ U. S . .205. 
30 102 U. S. l>!)l. 
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power (the commerce power of Congress) is indeed without limita-
tion. It authorizes Congress to prescribe the conditions upon which 
commerce in all its forms shall be conducted betw~en our citizens 
and the citizens of the several states, and to adopt measures to pro-
mote its growth and insure its safety. * * * The subjects upon which 
Congress can act under this power are of infinite variety, requiring 
for their successful management different plans or modes of treat-
ment. Some of them are national in their character and admit and 
require uniformity of regulat~on, affecting alike all the states; oth-
ers are local; or are mere aids to commerce, and can only be proper-
ly regulated by provisions adapted to their special circumstances and 
localities. * * * The uniformity of commercial regulation, which the 
grant to Congress was designed to secure against conflicting state 
provisions, was necessarily intended only for cases where such uni-
formity is practicable. Where from the nature of the subject or the 
sphere of its operation the case is local and limited, special regula-
tion adapted to the immediate locality could only have been contem-
plated. State action'upon such subject can constitute no interfer-
ence with the commercial power of Congress for when that acts 
the state authority is superseded. Inaction of Congress upon these 
subjects of a local nature or operation*** is (rather) to be deem-
ed a declaration that for the time being, and until it sees fit to act, 
they may be regulated by state authority." · 
It it clear from this reasoning and that of other cases40 along the 
same line, that the power of the state over these "mere aids to com-
merce" which are partly of a local character is not concurrent with 
th_e power of Congress but exists only during the inaction of Con-
gress. Even if we might assume the state regulations upon such a 
subject to be quite adequate, tending to conserve and promote the 
public interest and the commercial development of the country as a 
·whole there is nothing to prevent Congress from assuming its con-
stitutional power over the subject and rendering the state regula-
tions inoperative. 
In the Covington Bridge case41 the question for decision was 
whether a state might regulate tolls over an interstate bridge con-
••Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299: Esca11aba etc. Co. v. Cliicago, 107 U. S. 
683; Morgan v. Louisiana, u8 U. S. 455; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; 
Sands v. Manistee River Co., 123 U. S. 288, 295; Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396, 
4112; Gulf, Col. Etc. R'y v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 104; New Hat•en R. R. v. New York, 
165 U. S. 628, 63z-3; M K. & T. R'y v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626; CNnpagnie Fran· 
caise v. Bd. of Health, 186 U. S 380; Asbell v. K1msas, 209 U. S. 25t; Rock Island R'y 
Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 2n U. S. 612; So R'y 
Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 436-7; Valley S. S. Co. \'. Wottawa, 244 U. S. 202, 204. 
<1 IS4 lJ S. 204. 
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structed , with the approval of Congress by a corporation chartered 
jointly by that state and a sister state. The court held that the · · 
whole subject o( the charges of interstate bridges rests exclusively 
in Congress. In the course of its opinion the court stated: "It fol-
lows that if the state of Kentucky has the right to regulate the 
travel upon such bridge and fix the tolls, the state of Ohio has the 
same right. * * * Congress, and Congress alone, possesses the requi-
site power to harmonize such differences, and enact a uniform scale 
of charges. *"* * " The principle of this case is not peculiar. . It is· 
but the application of the now well-established doctrine42 that Con-
gress has exclusive control over fares and tariffs for interstate 
transportation. And it is the final correction of some of the reason-
ing put forth in the early ferry cases previously considered. It will 
be noted that these modifications are persistently in tl\e direction of 
making the power of Congress, within its constitutional field, i. e. 
within the bounds of what constitutes interstate commerce, ..more 
and more exhaustive, minute, and effective .. 
In conclusion, it should be recognized that this entire class of 
cases involving federal control over ferries and bridges between 
states, while resting upon the power of Congress to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, constitute more or less a class apart 
from other branches of regulation inasmuch as they concern "the 
navigable waters of the United States." Such waters have from the 
first been regarded as, in some sort, constituting a "natural trans-
portation medium" for commerce among the states and with for-
eign nations. Moreover, the peculiar relation of the watenvays to 
the national defense was not overlooked.43 For these reasons navi-
gable watenvays have been treated as a special province for th_!! 
regulating power of Congress. This is evidenced by the early dele-
gation of manifold powers to the Secretary of vVar, reaching in sev-
eral directions to the determination of minute details, with respect . 
to the rules and conditions of navigation. In the execution of the 
numerous 'Rivers and Harbors' acts, of which the .first of import-
ance was passed as early as 1826, and in carrying out the provisions 
.of special44 and general45 acts. conferring supervision over the loca-
tion and erection of structures over navigable waters, there has de-
veloped a remarkable body of federal administrative law. Far from 
militating against such a construction of the regulatory power of 
., To similar effect had been the decision in the State Toum1oc Tar cases, 12 'Vall • 
. :•'·· 
'-' Ueport of Secretary of War, 184 H •. Doc. 18th Cong., .2nd Ses., Vol. 1, No • .2, 55. 
•• Act authorizing construction of East River Bridge, .March 3, 1869 . 
.. Act relating to construction of bridges over Mississippi and Ohio rivers, June 4, 
1Sp. 
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Congress as would sanction its exercise in determining the conditions 
upon which corporation franchises may be exercised in interstate 
commerce the exertion of its power to such an extent over this por-
tion of the field tends to give support to its exertion, when the con-
ditions require it, in that portion with which we are herein directly 
concerned. 
The decisions covering the manner of conduct of interstate tele-
graph companies are singularly unsatisfactory. They exhibit a 
trend of opinion decidedly hesitant or backward in comparison with 
~ that Qf the bridge_and.. railroad ~ases with which they were declared 
exactly parallel at the outset. The development of the law govern-
ing these instrumentalities of interstate commerce may be conven-
iently divided into four steps : 
I. State laws imposing taxes in any form upon the inter-
state business of a telegraph company have of course been 
declared invalid,-Western Union Telegraph Company v. 
Te:ms.46 In that case the court took occasion to remark, "A 
telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce 
as a carrier of messages, that a railway company does as a 
carrier of goods." It was held accordingly to fall within the 
rule of: Case of the State Freight Tax,47 The State Tonnage 
cases,48 Passenger cases.49 
2. The cases involving more particularly state regulation 
of the manner of conduct of the business, such as the trans-
mission and delivery of interstate messages started out with 
the rule that such regulation of interstate messages is void. 
And apparently it would have been held invalid even for the 
manner of delivery within the state of interstate messages, 
for the rule was adopted upon the view that the manner of 
conduct of the interstate telegraphic business is a subject re-
quiring a uniform national rule and so exclusively within the 
sphere of federal authority.50 
3. This was later modified to make the subject fall within 
the concurrent authority of the state, so far, but so far only, 
as the order of transmission and manner of delivery of inter-
state messages affected the conduct of the company within 
the state. Thus the original sending of messages from a 
... 105 u. s. 460. 
<t 15 \Vall 232. 
cs 12 \Vall 20+ 
47 7 How. 283. 
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state office or the delivery of interstate messages received at 
an office within the state and addressed to a person there were 
. matters of state control in the absence of federal regulation, 
at least, so long as no onerous burden was placed upon the 
company. So it was held in the Western Union Telegraph 
Company v. James.n As the court said of the Georgia statute 
in that case, "It can be fully carried out and obeyed without 
in any manner affecting the conduct of the company with re-
gard to the performance of its duties in other states." It 
should be recognized that the regulation was more burden-
some in the Indiana case than in the Georgia case. Yet in 
neither case did the court find it unreasonable. Hence the 
conclusion that there was a different principle applied is un-
avoidable. The James case was followed in every essential 
respect by the case of the Western Union Telegraph Company 
v. Commercial Milling Company52 though the Michigan sta-
tute involved there was a regulation of the liability of tele-
graph companies to the senders of messages sent out. of the 
state. 
4. But finally this principle of concurrent power of the 
states over interstate messages was extended to cover the 
regulation of conduct of the companies relative to the hand-
1ing of interstate messages beyond the boundaries of the state 
where they were dispatched. Such was the effect of uphold-
ing the Virginia statute in Western· Union Telegraph 
Company v. Crovo.53 Although that statute contained a 
clause regulating the priority of delivery beyond the bounds 
of the state of messages sent from within the state, as that 
was not a point at issue the court refused to rule on the ques-
tion, declaring that in any case this clause was separable from 
the rest of the statute. But it did decide that the require-
ment that the telegraph company should deliver at points out-
side of the state messages sent from within the state "as 
promptly as practicable" was a valid police regulation by Con-
gress covering that subject. 
Thus in the departure from the rule of the Pe11dleton case that 
this subject is one requiring uniformity of regulation and is exclu-
sively given to authority of Congress, there is a gradual tendency 
to make the departure more radical and incisive. First, the state 
ISt 162 u. s. 650. 
lil 218 u. s. 406 • 
.. 220 u. s. 364. 
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law-directing the m.anm·r of delivery of.interstate messages address-
ed to persru:iS"within the state is upheld. Second, a state law fixing 
the -liability of parties rnntracting for transmission of an interstate 
message is upheld. And third, a ·State law prescribing the manner 
of delivery of interstak nwssages at points outside of the state is 
held valid. It must be n·mark1·d in connection with the last decision 
that the required manner of cklivery was not onerous. '!'hough it 
was expressly recogni?:ecl by J udg-1~ 1'1~CKHAll1 in the James case that 
there was no attempt "to enforce tlw provisions of the state statute 
beyond the limits of the state," that is the very thing that was sanc-
tioned in the last, the Cro'llo case. Wlwrcas in the first case, it was 
recognized that the statute could "he· fully carried out and obeyed 
without in any manner affecting the conduct of the company with 
regard to the performance of its duties in otlter states;" the decis-
ion in the Virginia case went upon the very point that the conduct 
of the telegraph company in another state was not in accordance 
with the laws of Virginia. - · 
Nevertheless the important point is that in all these cases reserva-
tion has been made of the power of Congress to intervene and ex-
ercise a paramount authority whenever it deems uniform regulation 
expedienj:. And in spite of the tendency of these late cases it is 
hardly likely that the court will fail to apply the principle it recogniz-
ed in the Texas case of the virtual identity in the power of Congress 
over railrpads and telegraph lines. 
The law involving express companies has had a somewhat later 
and more uniform development. This was probably due to the 
absence for a long time of attempts at vigorous state regulation. 
It has been the experience of aff forms of regulation under the com-
merce power, practically without exception, that the federal power 
has been exerted only after some experimenting with state regula-
tion has revealed defects or shortcomings to which the national 
regulation has been applied as a remedy. This has been true of the 
regulation of express companies also. The first really important 
case was that of Crutcher v. K.enttecky54 decided in 189r. The court 
held unconstitutional a statute requiring that all foreign express com-
panies desiring to do business within the state should obtain a license 
to which a small fee was attached and should otherwise fulfill cer-
tain conditions. This decision manifestly advanced a step beyond 
the doctrine upheld in a long line of cases5G that a state cannot tax 
51 I4I U. 5. 47• 
.. Brown v • • ~faryland, 12 Wheat 419; Railroads Gross Receipts Casc,· 1·5-\Vall • .284; 
Te:ras Telegraph Case, ios U. S. 460; Roblrins v. Shelby Cou11t_,., i~o U. S. 4&9; Li:Loup 
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"interstate commerce in ~y form, whether by way of duties laid on 
the transportation* * *, or on the receipts* * * , or .on the occupa-
tion or business of carrying it on."G6 
The purpose which the state intend~d to effectuate by this law was 
clearly to safeguard the interests of creditors and those who having 
dealings \Vith express companies might be residents within the state. 
It was not so much a taxation measure as a measure making for the 
security of the commerce and industry in which its citizens might be 
involved. Nevertheless it was not a local police measure within the 
meaning of the decisions in New v. M£Jne51 or Smith v. Alabama.ss 
Thus the court declared: "This (law) of course embraces interstate 
business as well as business confined wholly within the state * * * 
If the subject was one which appertained to the jurisdiction of the 
state legislature, it may be that the requirements and conditions of 
doing business entirely within the state should be promotive of the 
public good. It is clear, however, that it would be a regulation of 
interstate commerce in its application to corporations or associations 
engaged in that business, and that is a subject which belongs to the 
jurisdiction of the national and not the state legislature. Congress 
would undoubtedly have the right to exact from associations of that 
kind auy guarantees it might deem necessary for the pitblic security 
and the faithful tra.nsaction of business ;~0 and as it is within the 
_province of Congress it is to be presumed that Congress has done or 
will do all that is necessary and proper in that regard. * * * To carry 
011 bzterstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by 
the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is 
entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States ; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of 
convenience in carrying on their business cannot have the effect of 
depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to inter-
pose some contrary regu.lation."60 
Such a paragraph has very strong implications. The parts itali-
cized would seem to make direct admission of the power in Congress 
to declare the rule of stockholders' liability, and to determine under 
what conditions the franchise to transact interstate commerce shall 
be exercised. Nevertheless it should not be overlooked that there is 
, .. Mobile, I27 U. $. 640; Welton v. Misso11ri, 91 U. S. 275; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 
U. S. 31; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall 232;_Pickard v. Pullman Co., n7 U. S. 34; Wali· 
ing v. Michigan, n6 U. S. 446; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Western Union T. 
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. I. , 
""Chief Justice Fuller in Lyng v. Miclrigan, 135 U. S. 161. 
ct 11 Peters 119 • 
.. 124 u. s. 465 • 
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nowhere any intimation of the sovereign power to create corpora-
tions which may engage in interstate commerce. It is only by anal-
ogy and inference, however clear and strong that analogy and inf er-
ence, that we may get from these .senfenJ:es: a concession that Con-
gress has the constitutional power to pass an.e..~.clusive federal incor-
poration law. 
Subsequently in the important ruling of Adams Express Company 
v. Ohio61 there was established a taxation doctrine which, while 
theoretically it appears to conserve the powers of the states in prac-
tice has not been permitted to affect the ·relative authority of the 
state and federal governments over these instruments of interstate 
commerce. An Ohio statute of 1893 provided that such a propor-
tion of the total assets of every express company as its gross receipts 
in Ohio bore t<? the gross receipts· from all its business should be 
subject to the property tax of Ohio. The majority of the court took 
the view that such a measure was a tax on property and not on re-
ceipts and thus was not a direct burden on interstate commerce and 
could not be used as a means to its regulation. The rule announced62 
by the court may be taken as the accepted general rule today63 and a 
proper constructiorr of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kan-
sa.s'* and Sou,thern Railway Company v. Greene65 will prove them 
not to be exceptions. But these two cases do nevertheless modify 
the doctrine in the sense of restricting its logical extension. It in-
volves very clearly an application of the economic theory of income 
capitalization as value detenninator. And this results, as was recog-
nizea by the majority of the court in the two cases last mentioned 
and by the minority of the court in the Ohio case, whether exercised 
in the form of·business licensing or property taxation in nothing less 
than a tax upon the profits of interstate commerce. It is a limitation 
placed by a state upon the franchise to engage in interstate business ; 
but it is now settled that where such measures operate as a distinct 
burden upon interstate commerce they will not be sustained. In any 
n 165 U. S. 1g+ 
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event, doctrines formulated respecting the law of taxation have only 
a very restricted bearing in other fields of action, e. g., commerce 
regulations. 
The first step in the positive regulation of express companies by 
Congress was to govern their relations to shippers. The application 
of this law formed the basis of contention in Adams £%press Com-
pany v. Croninger66 decided in i912. The shipper's receipt limited 
the liability of the express company to $so.oo in accordance with the 
published tariff which proyided graduated rates according to the 
value of shipments. The law of the jurisdiction did not permit car-
riers to contract away any of their liability for the delivery of ship-
ments. By the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of 19o6, 
Congress had declared that the rules of liability should be uniform 
on all interstate shipments and had.provided that the carrier "should 
be liable for any loss*** or injury to such property caused by it," 
and furthermore that "no contract * * * should exempt such carrier 
* * * from the liability hereby imposed." The court held that the 
tariff of the company was not inconsistent with this law, and that 
the regulation of Congress superseded all state rules and -regulations. 
The court said "that the constitutional power of Congress to regu-
late commerce among the ·states and with foreign natiolls compre;. 
hends power. to regulate contracts between the shipper and· the car-
rier of an interstate shipment by defining the liability of the carrier 
for loss, delay, injury, or damage to property, needs neither argu-
ment nor citation of authority." · 
It will be seen from the character of the regulation here in ques-
tion that Congress has occupied at least partially the field of regu-· 
lation marked out in tl:;ie Crutcher decision. If it may go thus far 
unquestioned ("need neither argument nor citation of authority") 
may it not go further when conditions in the judgment of Congress 
demand it in protecting all parties who deal with these corporate 
agencies of interstate commerce? A federal incorporation law, be it 
remembered, would be designed to serve substantially the same end: 
to safeguard the interests of not only those who confide their goods 
to express companies for transmission but also those who entrust 
their funds to such corporations for investment. 
[To BE CONTINUED] 
MYRON w. WATKINS. 
U1iiversity of Missouri . 
.. 226 u. s. 491. 
